Blog by Kate Donald, Director of CESR's Human Rights in Sustainable Development Program.
The Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) is particularly concerned that SDG 10 (‘Reduce inequality within and between countries’) does not include a robust measure of economic inequality, and as such this indicator set is woefully incomplete. Economic inequality is a particularly pervasive and cross-cutting form of inequality that is a pressing issue in all countries, negatively impacting human rights enjoyment as well as poverty reduction and growth. Moreover, good methodologies to measure economic inequality already exist, which can easily be applied globally.
In general, the indicators for SDG10 that touch on income focus solely on the bottom end of the spectrum, thereby neglecting to consider high earners and the top wealth brackets. Including the top end of the distribution is essential when assessing overall economic inequality (given that inequality is by definition relative, and the accumulation of wealth and income at the top has direct impacts on the situation of those at the bottom).
CESR and others proposed a specific indicator that would have captured these concerns and measured the full distributive impacts of fiscal policy: the Palma ratio measured pre-tax and post-social transfers. Unfortunately, although a similar indicator did feature in previous IAEG proposals, neither this eminently measurable indicator nor the more widely-used Gini coefficient were included in the final draft. This leaves Goal 10 without a badly-needed economic inequality indicator and failing to address a crucial aspect of Target 10.4 ‘Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality’. These shortfalls make it more likely this target will be overlooked by policy-makers.
One of the most important and hard-won elements of Target 10.4 is its explicit recognition of fiscal policy as a determinant of inequality, but the sole indicator agreed focuses on wages and social protection transfers (and moreover lumps them together in a way which dims the indicator’s power). Given the growing evidence of how fiscal policies can affect human rights, we feel this is a lamentable omission from the IAEG, distorting and unbalancing the target and the goal itself.
The final Agenda 2030 agreement Transforming Our World states that “inclusive and sustainable economic growth…will only be possible if wealth is shared and income inequality is addressed”. If the implementation of Agenda 2030 is to meet this essential condition, it will be necessary to incentivize the right policy actions with relevant indicators. It is to be hoped that national-level indicator sets can correct this glaring gap in the global list.
- To learn more about CESR's work on Human Rights and Sustainable Development, see here.
Four months have now passed since Agenda 2030 – the new sustainable development goals for the next 15 years – was agreed at the UN in New York. Targets have been set under each of the 17 goals, but the crucial matter of designating indicators to measure progress remains in the balance.
That some of the indicators remain undecided is not in itself a problem, but there is growing concern over those that have already been defined, as several of them may lead to skewed and/or inadequate tracking of progress. At an October meeting of the IAEG in Bangkok, the majority of indicators were announced as agreed or final, with very little transparency as to how these decisions had been taken. And in many cases, they seem quite arbitrary and uninformed.
The multidimensional character of some of the targets is lost in attempts to capture them in a single indicator. For example, we are left with an inequality goal which does not include a robust measure of income inequality, although good methodologies already exist. Target 10.4 is to ‘Adopt policies, especially fiscal, wage and social protection policies, and progressively achieve greater equality’. However, the indicator agreed focuses almost solely on wages. This completely fails to measure at least one crucial stated aspect of the target: how fiscal policies can play a key role in improving equality. For this reason, the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) has consistently advocated for using an additional inequality indicator – the Palma ratio of the share of gross national income held by the top 10% versus that of the bottom 40%, measured pre-tax and post-social transfers – which would look at the full distributive impacts of fiscal policy.
Other indicators being proposed are manifestly inadequate. For example, the suggested indicator for target 17.13 – ‘Enhance global macroeconomic stability, including through policy coordination and policy coherence’ – is Gross Domestic Product (GDP), which is not relevant for any aspect of the target.
This reality is problematic because indicators are not only measures by which progress can be judged; they also focus attention on particular groups or issues and create incentives for policy action. If an indicator is reductive and of questionable relevance, then it implicitly allows governments to get away with doing little to achieve the (carefully negotiated and crucial) target, and this in turn undermines accountability.
These concerns and others were addressed at a civil society briefing and exchange with member states at the UN in New York in January. At that event, Kate Donald from CESR spoke about some of the deficiencies of the current proposals from a human rights perspective, building on our report The Measure of Progress and our experience in human rights monitoring.
Admittedly, the global indicator framework was never likely to be perfect or perfectly comprehensive, and there is a limit to how relevant a global indicator can be to every country. Some indicators will inevitably be of less relevance to certain countries, while the specific issues they face under particular targets may not be well covered. While all countries face important challenges on issues like water quality, access to free quality education, access to justice and poverty, the nature and scale of these challenges is undoubtedly different and will require different policies and actions.
With the deficiencies of the global indicators becoming increasingly apparent, the national level will be a crucial space for identifying and applying indicators. To this end, CESR has been working with national groups on how to develop national indicators to measure progress towards the SDGs and international human rights obligations.
Kate recently participated in an expert working group bringing together access to justice practitioners in the United States to propose national indicators for SDG target 16.3; ‘…ensure equal access to justice for all’. The suggested global indicators focus on the crime reporting rate and the proportion of those who have faced a dispute and accessed some kind of resolution mechanism. These issues have some relevance in the US, but do not address the more nationally resonant and policy-sensitive problems of access to legal aid or the right to counsel without charge for tenants facing eviction. Kate shared insights on the SDG indicator process and on how indicators can best take into account human rights principles and standards.
In December, CESR’s Allison Corkery participated in a workshop in Nairobi on the monitoring of access to information as it pertains to the rights to water and sanitation – an issue of critical relevance to the implementation of SDG 6 (Ensure water and sanitation for all). Co-convened by the Kenya National Commission on Human Rights and Article 19, it focused on the Free Flow Principles, which are a wide-ranging set of guidelines developed by Article 19 to promote access to information, transparency, accountability, good governance and civic engagement in the water and sanitation sectors. Allison highlighted the value of using indicators and benchmarks in such monitoring. She also facilitated a brainstorming exercise to identify the principles most relevant to the Kenyan context—an exercise that highlighted the complexity of accommodating the interests and priorities of diverse stakeholders, which is a crucial first step in identifying appropriate indicators.
As the SDG experience is showing, the selection of indicators (especially when on a tight timeline and at a global scale) is fraught with perils and pitfalls. Nevertheless, well-chosen indicators that are fleshed out with reliable data are a crucial building block of accountability and can provide an important tool and evidence base for both human rights claims and policy reforms. To be successful, indicators (whether they be global or national) require broad support and buy-in. To secure that, it is vital that the process of agreeing them is open, transparent, and participatory, so that the indicators reflect rights-holders’ concerns and perspectives, whilst also focusing policy efforts effectively.
- For more on CESR’s work on the Sustainable Development Goals, see here.
- For more on CESR’s related work, see Human Rights Monitoring, The OPERA Framework and our recent publication The Measure of Progress.
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This blog by Kate Donald, Director of CESR's Human Rights in Development Program, was originally published by the Health and Human Rights Journal.
From a human rights perspective, there is little doubt that the new Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) are a huge improvement on their predecessors, the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). However, there is one critical area where it seems lessons from the MDG era have remained frustratingly unlearned: accountability.
Amid the fanfare of the SDGs’ adoption in September 2015, it was easy to focus on the goals and targets themselves, and overlook the three pages hidden deeper into the ‘2030 Agenda’ which are intended to outline a framework for ‘follow-up and review’. Despite some important references to state-citizen accountability, participation, and respecting human rights, the vision is astonishingly vague and timid. The document offers no clear picture on how SDG progress will be monitored and reviewed or what the lines and channels of accountability will be, and includes only very tentative and under-ambitious proposals and guidelines.
This is not an accidental omission. Throughout the negotiation process, it was clear that there was very little political will for underpinning the new agenda with accountability. From the very start, many government representatives displayed a conveniently narrow understanding of accountability, claiming that it could not possibly be relevant because the goals would not be legally binding. These reservations led the ‘monitoring and accountability’ chapter to be renamed ‘follow-up and review’. Further into the negotiations, some states tried to end the use of the ‘A word’ entirely, and warned ominously that ‘finger-pointing’ and ‘naming and shaming’ would be counterproductive.
As the Center for Economic and Social Rights (CESR) has argued since we co-published Who Will be Accountable? in 2013, underpinning the new agenda with a web of accountability mechanisms is essential to ensure the new commitments are credible and honored in practice. Unfortunately, despite constructive proposals and strenuous advocacy from civil society, these ideas remained politically unpalatable. Some states (including many EU countries, Mexico and Peru) did champion more robust accountability arrangements, but the consensus was against them and no one state or negotiating bloc with real leverage power was willing to make the issue a priority or red line. As a result, in the haggling over final language, the mere suggestion that countries may conduct a review of progress at least every four years was removed. It is indeed a sorry sign that this was considered too ambitious.
Some countries (in particular those with a history of receiving aid accompanied by a laundry list of onerous conditionalities) see any monitoring that takes place beyond the national level as infringing their sovereignty and policy space and exposing them to scolding from rich countries and the UN. This has made the negotiations over the global level of SDG ‘follow-up and review’ (which is envisaged to have national, regional and international components) all the more difficult.
There is already a designated forum for the purpose of reviewing SDG progress and challenges: the High-Level Political Forum (HLPF), which was established at the Rio conference in 2012 and has been a somewhat aimless annual gathering at the UN since 2013. This year, it will assume its real purpose; but it is still unclear what form the reviews and discussions might take, and whether they might be able to deliver anything approaching accountability. There will be thematic reviews on goal areas and cross-cutting issues such as inequality and health; as well as country reviews where specific countries will step forward to discuss their progress and challenges. However, their efficacy and meaningfulness will likely be severely constrained not only by their voluntary nature, but also by the fact that the HLPF only meets for eight days each year and is hugely under-staffed and under-resourced.
Although the rhetoric from decision-makers is strongly welcoming of civil society participation in the HLPF reviews, it remains to be seen what this might mean in practice. It now seems unlikely, for example, that civil society will be given an official channel to submit ‘shadow reports’ which might complement or call into question states’ official presentations. Without consideration of such independent accounts, the legitimacy of these reviews will be highly questionable, and may not rise above the level of the MDGs’ toothless ‘Annual Ministerial Reviews’, which amounted to little more than a best practices showcase. The process to develop global indicators has also delivered warning signs that measurement of progress at the global level may well distort and undercut the priorities enshrined in the SDGs, especially the more contentious ones around resources, inequality and governance.
Many were counting on the UN Secretary-General to deliver a shot of ambition with some innovative new proposals on how the HLPF reviews might operate. However, on first analysis his recently published recommendations remain somewhat lackluster. For now, it is wise for civil society to dedicate energy to developing innovative and ambitious accountability mechanisms (and indicators) at the national level. Here too, some governments will inevitably drag their feet, but pressure from advocates and activists could make a real difference. Health is a thematic area (and of course a stand-alone SDG) where there are perhaps the most promising precedents to build on. This is true both at the global level—see for example the Commission on Information and Accountability for Women’s and Children’s Health, discussed by Paul Hunt—and at national/local levels, where social accountability initiatives focused on health services have proliferated in recent years led by communities, civil society and occasionally government actors.
It will also be imperative to pay close attention to the accountability gaps above and beyond the state where the deficits are particularly acute. For example, the role and impact of the private sector will require special vigilance especially given the uncritical fervor many governments are adopting for Public-Private Partnerships in development. Meanwhile, in our globalized world the transnational ‘spillover’ impacts of one country’s policies (for example, tax, trade, environmental or investment) on another’s development can be profound, and some measure of awareness and accountability is desperately needed in this arena.
The years 2015-2030 offer an unmissable opportunity to address the accountability gaps that have plagued development policy and practice for decades. For civil society and social movements, there is a lot of hard work to be done to ensure the potential of the SDGs as a vehicle of human rights realization and accountability is not squandered.Posted by Kate Donald on January 25th, 2016
At around 6:30pm on Sunday, after frantic negotiations all weekend, the final version of ‘The 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development’ was agreed by UN member states in New York, including the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and targets themselves. The negotiations were intended to close on Friday, but by 4:30am on Saturday morning, it was clear that consensus was still out of reach. The contentious issues were frustratingly familiar: the scope that should be given to the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR); language on climate change and human rights; and developing countries’ ‘policy space’ particularly vis-à-vis international financial institutions (IFIs).
For CESR it was particularly disappointing to see human rights language become a bargaining chip at the eleventh hour, given that we have been striving since 2010 to see human rights principles and obligations meaningfully reflected in the post-2015 agenda. Moving into Friday, the draft Declaration text included a very strong recognition that the realization of all human rights is a principal aim of sustainable development, and an explicit commitment to non-discrimination for all:
"This is an Agenda which seeks to respect, protect and fulfil all human rights. It will work to ensure that human rights and fundamental freedoms are enjoyed by all without discrimination on grounds of race, ethnicity, color, sex, age, language, religion, culture, migration status, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic situation, birth, disability or other status."On Friday night, two negotiating blocs of member states – the African Group and the Arab Group – raised fierce (and legally incoherent) objections to this language and demanded several caveats, including the removal of ‘other status’ at the end of the list of protected grounds (used in human rights treaties ever since the Universal Declaration). Sadly, it seems clear from statements made by certain member states that this was motivated by the desire to avoid recognizing the rights of LGBT people (they also objected to the phrase ‘all social and economic groups’ elsewhere in the document for similar reasons, and insisted that every use of the phrase ‘gender equality’ be followed by language about the empowerment of women and girls). This became a redline issue, with the African and Arab Groups refusing to countenance the language provided while others (including many Latin American countries, the EU and the US) held firm against dilution. In the end, the compromise the drafters found was to replace the text with a verbatim cut-and-paste of language from the Rio+20 outcome document, The Future We Want.
"We reaffirm the importance of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, as well as other international instruments relating to human rights and international law. We emphasize the responsibilities of all States, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations, to respect, protect and promote human rights and fundamental freedoms for all, without distinction of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, disability or other status."It was a savvy political strategy, as the Rio language still includes the all-important phrase ‘or other status’ (recognizing that discrimination on any ground is unacceptable) but would have been nigh impossible for the African and Arab Groups to object to, given its status as agreed language in a political declaration which is a foundation text for post-2015.
However, the compromise was profoundly disappointing as the Rio language manifests a number of weaknesses and gaps in relation to the previous language, including by failing to specifically mention age, ethnicity or migration status as prohibited grounds of discrimination. It is also a shame to see a statement which made important, explicit links between the post-2015 agenda itself and respecting, protecting and fulfilling human rights replaced with a general reaffirmation of ‘importance’ and ‘responsibilities’. (It is also worth noting that language on the right to water and sanitation – which many civil society organizations fought tirelessly for – in the end also reverted to the formulation agreed to at Rio+20, after the US objected to more concrete formulations around ‘realizing’ the right.)
To be sure, it is deeply frustrating and disconcerting that we are still fighting these battles in the halls of the UN. It is now more than two decades since the UN reaffirmed the interdependence of human rights and development at the Vienna World Conference on Human Rights; and more than twenty years since the UN human rights system first recognized sexual orientation and gender identity as prohibited grounds of discrimination.
However, there is other powerful human rights language in the outcome document to take solace in, including a recognition in the preamble that the SDGs ‘seek to realize the human rights of all’. Indeed, overall there is cause for both frustration and celebration when reviewing the final outcome document. Lining it up against the ‘Human Rights Litmus Test’ that the Post-2015 Human Rights Caucus developed last year, we can declare partial success in every category – which in some ways is more than we might have dared hope for back in 2010 under the ‘reign’ of the deeply inadequate Millennium Development Goals (MDGs).
There is precious little in the document to allay civil society fears about corporate ‘capture’ of development or reassure them about meaningful private sector regulation and accountability – but a welcome reference to labor, environmental and human rights standards (including the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights) did finally make the cut. The agenda includes potentially transformative commitments for women’s rights (especially when compared to the MDGs), but it was clear from the negotiations and textual compromises that sexual and reproductive health and rights are still disputed and violated by many governments – and the SDGs are unlikely to spur a wholesale shift in this regard.
Despite some important references to State-citizen accountability, participation and respecting human rights, the framework for monitoring and review of the agenda’s implementation is vague and voluntary. In terms of financing and resources, the already-weak Financing for Development ‘commitments’ agreed in Addis in June were selectively interpreted further in favour of developed countries (for example on debt and policy space), fomenting further fear about the real intentions of developed countries to enable the profound systemic changes necessary to finance and implement this agenda. However, we shouldn’t forget the important resource-related commitments enshrined in the SDG targets, especially around debt, progressive taxation, illicit financial flows and enhancing the representation of developing countries in global economic governance.
Indeed, despite its compromises and shortfalls, this 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development gives the human rights movement much to work with over the next 15 years. In its universality, in its focus on tackling inequalities and insistence on ‘leaving no one behind’, and in its declaratory anchoring in international human rights commitments, it has the potential to be truly transformative for human rights enjoyment. The real litmus test will of course be implementation, in particular whether we will see meaningful reforms that remove the systemic obstacles to equitable, sufficient and accountable financing for sustainable development, and whether the monitoring and accountability infrastructure put in place at the national, regional and global levels ensures that all states and other power-holders are answerable to the people whose lives and rights they affect.
There is a lot of hard work to be done to unleash the potential of the SDGs as a vehicle of human rights realization and accountability. But the space has been opened, and a comprehensive framework of hard-won commitments is about to be put in place in all countries across the globe. For the human rights movement and its allies in development, efforts must begin in earnest now to ensure this historic opportunity is not lost.
- To learn more about CESR's work on Human Rights in Sustainable Development, click here.
Posted by Kate Donald on August 5th, 2015
Today, diplomats at the UN in New York enter into two weeks of final negotiations on the new global sustainable development agenda for 2015 to 2030. Coming hot on the heels after a grueling few days in Addis Ababa, which culminated in an agreement on Financing for Development that did not live up to the demands and expectations of the G77 (nor those of civil society), it is difficult to tell what the spillover effects might be. The disappointments of Addis may well harden the resolve of the developing countries to stick firm on certain points; certainly they have already made clear that the inclusion of the principle of “common but differentiated responsibilities” in the outcome document of the September UN Summit which will adopt the new agenda will be non-negotiable for them, despite the firm resistance of the UK, US and others.
In the days before Addis, the co-facilitators released a new draft of the outcome document (which they labeled, with considerable chutzpah, as ‘final’). This will presumably be discussed line-by-line over the next two weeks – a level of detail and rigour lamentably not seen so far in the negotiations, which have mostly been characterized by sweeping and repetitive statements by delegations.
Happily, the revised draft features a number of improvements on the previous ‘zero’ draft (which we commented on here). In particular, the language in the Declaration has improved considerably with regard to human rights, thanks to feedback and concrete suggestions by Member States, civil society and the UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR). The drafters have added ‘international human rights treaties’ alongside the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the Declaration on the Right to Development as instruments on which the agenda is founded; and a reference to access to safe and affordable drinking water as ‘a basic and universal human right’. After forceful urging from many actors, they have also included age in the list of prohibited grounds of discrimination, and even more crucially, have made the list an open one by adding ‘and other status’ at the end, a crucial recognition that discrimination on any basis is impermissible in development.
Of course, these improvements may be vulnerable to challenge over the next two weeks. The US, for example, has always disputed the right to development and so may well seek to remove reference to it in the Declaration, but developing countries will be very unlikely to accept such a move.
For CESR and many of our allies, the major area of outstanding concern is the ‘follow-up and review’ component of the final agenda, which has been weakened even further from the zero draft into what is now an astonishingly vague and timid vision. Although there are a couple of welcome references to State-citizen accountability as the ultimate goal of this follow-up and review framework, the document offers no clear picture on how progress on the Sustainable Development Goals will be monitored and reviewed, nor what the lines and channels of accountability will be, and includes only very tentative and under-ambitious proposals and guidelines. For example, language merely suggesting that countries may conduct a review process at least every four years has been removed. It is indeed a sorry sign that this is considered too ambitious. Any less would mean countries only assessing their progress a maximum of two or three times during 2015-30.
This is not the responsive, inclusive agenda based on up-to-date data that we were promised. Policies will need to be refined and adapted. Priorities may change. Tactics and strategies will shift, as will challenges. Obstacles to progress for the most marginalized communities may take some time to identify and break down. Monitoring and review processes will play an absolutely indispensable role in defining what is working and what needs to be improved, and in ensuring the experiences and ideas of the most disadvantaged and marginalized people can be reflected and taken on board. How can we ‘leave no one behind’ if we are not regularly and systematically hearing from those that are furthest behind?
Unfortunately, most Member States are failing to see this crucial link – between effective implementation and robust monitoring and accountability. They see efforts to define and bolster a monitoring and review framework as bureaucratic meddling that will undermine national sovereignty and result in blame games and finger-pointing. Some countries (in particular those with a history of receiving aid from donors that comes with a laundry list of onerous conditionalities) see any monitoring that takes place beyond the national level as something that will expose them to infringements on their policy space and scolding from the rich countries and the UN.
The fact is, we now have a much better set of goals and targets than we did in 2000 – and Member States should be applauded for coming to this agreement. But without effective and holistic monitoring and review, and clearly delineated responsibilities for meeting these goals, we will not change the paradigm. Implementation will suffer, and progress towards the most challenging targets will remain off-track and uneven. In short, the much-needed ambition of the goals will be wasted.
Sadly, although much could change over the coming weeks, it doesn’t realistically seem like there are great prospects for significant improvements to this section. The watering-down exercise performed by the drafters was, after all, in response to common complaints from delegates at the last session that the vision for follow-up and review was ‘too prescriptive’.
All these States of course confidently assert that while they don’t want anyone telling them how to do it, they will put in place thorough and inclusive processes at national level. But why would they object to language laying out baselines and basic principles for these national reviews? Of course, different models will be needed in different contexts. But surely meaningful, free and active participation, transparency, and human rights should be fundamental to all national mechanisms and processes? Particularly for an agenda which includes a goal on building ‘effective, accountable and inclusive institutions at all levels’. Periodic, regular reviews involving parliaments, civil society, experts, national human rights institutions and sustainable development councils – and crucially, the people whose situations we are most seeking to improve – should not be too ‘prescriptive’ for anyone. If States really are intending to be accountable to their citizens at the national level for these commitments, then they have no reason not to explicitly signal their intent and commitment to do so in this outcome document.
As CESR has argued since we published Who Will be Accountable? with OHCHR in 2013, underpinning the new agenda with a web of effective accountability mechanisms will be necessary to ensure the new commitments are credible and honored in practice. Member States now have an unmissable opportunity to address the accountability gaps that have plagued development policy and practice for decades now. However, it is not an accident that this is the only area of the draft outcome document that has been actively and consistently weakened, rather than improved and strengthened. Despite their rhetoric, the idea of being held accountable by the people for their development and human rights commitments is still unpalatable to many governments.
This reluctance is of course being loudly and actively challenged by civil society and social movements across the world. For many civil society actors, the lack of ambition and commitment on accountability is likely to be the most pronounced area of disappointment in the final post-2015 package adopted in September. Even if we don’t win the battle to strengthen the depleted vision in the outcome document, undoubtedly Member States will find themselves being constantly challenged over the next 15 years to transparently monitor and answer to their commitments. CESR, for one, will be working to build on the momentum for human rights accountability that we have helped generate around this agenda. The energy unleashed by the post-2015 process is unmistakable, and the genie is out of the bottle.
By Kate Donald, Director of CESR's Human Rights in Development program
Among the members of the Post-2015 Human Rights Caucus, there is striking consensus on the basic elements of the zero draft that should be strengthened:
- Stronger human rights language in the Declaration
Happily, there is some eloquent human rights language in the draft Declaration text. However, human rights are deployed mostly as a rhetorical flourish rather than being framed as legally binding commitments and standards which should guide the implementation of the agenda. The Millennium Declaration provides a good model in this regard, and it would be sad indeed to see a political declaration on development in 2015 backsliding from the words used in 2000.
- Rule out discrimination on any ground
The zero draft states that the agenda will work to ensure that rights are “enjoyed by all without discrimination on grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, culture, migratory status, political or other opinion, national or social origin, economic situation, birth or disability.” This ‘closed’ list is not consistent with agreed language on discrimination in human rights standards and elsewhere, and indeed is even less comprehensive than the language in the Open Working Group outcome document. For example, discrimination on grounds of age, sexual orientation and gender identity are conspicuously excluded in this formulation, despite the visibility civil society groups have given these issues in the post-2015 context. Discrimination on any ground is unacceptable, and the post-2015 Declaration must recognize this by naming other relevant grounds of discrimination (at the least, reverting to the list used by the Open Working Group which is more comprehensive despite important deficiencies) and ensuring that the list is ‘open’ - ending with the words ‘or other status’.
- A robust framework for accountability in the ‘follow-up and review’ section
Civil society has been consistent in demanding that a meaningful and participatory monitoring and accountability architecture is an essential component of the post-2015 agenda, necessary for more effective and empowering implementation that can truly ‘leave no one behind’. Unfortunately, the zero draft does not deliver a clear or ambitious vision on this front. CESR and many other members of the Human Rights Caucus and civil society have responded with calls for:
(a) Corporate accountability: the role of the private sector in financing the agenda is uncritically endorsed in the zero draft, but with no reference to any regulation, monitoring or accountability as to the impacts of their actions and activities.Unfortunately, the negotiations last week demonstrated very little appetite for improving the draft along these lines. Although several Member States spoke favourably about retaining or strengthening the human rights references, the African Group criticized the ‘disproportionate emphasis’ on human rights in the current draft, insisting that human rights have their own pillar at the UN and therefore should not be mixed up in a sustainable development agenda. After several decades of human rights ‘mainstreaming’ and the human rights-based approach to development, it is profoundly troubling that we still hear these kinds of statements in the halls of the UN.
(b) Recognition of the role of human rights mechanisms: although the zero draft does flag the need for utilizing existing monitoring platforms and processes at the national and international levels, the potentially powerful roles of National Human Rights Institutions, regional human rights bodies and the international human rights mechanisms (such as the UPR and the ‘treaty bodies’ that monitor implementation of the core international human rights treaties) are not mentioned.
(c) Fleshing out the guiding principles: the ‘principles’ outlined to guide the follow-up and review don’t set a high bar. Important principles like universality and transparency get very short shrift, and adjectives like ‘participatory’ and ‘inclusive’ are used without any real definition or standard. Here, human rights principles and standards will be crucial – for example, national level reviews are very unlikely to be ‘robust’ or ‘inclusive’ if the rights to freedom of speech, freedom of assembly and association are not upheld. Even something that has seemed like a fairly basic and non-controversial demand - official channels for civil society ‘shadow’ or alternative reports (at national and international levels) - is only tentatively suggested.
As for follow-up and review, a majority of Member States insisted that the zero draft was ‘too prescriptive’, which is perplexing given the draft only rather vaguely outlines a review architecture that would likely fall far short of what is required. (By way of example, it includes only two sentences on national review, hedged with phrases like ‘we encourage’ and ‘Member States could…’.) Frustratingly, the aversion to anything concrete seems partially designed to kick the can down the road indefinitely. If the September outcome doesn’t include a clear vision as to the who, where, what and how of post-2015 monitoring and review, it is difficult to understand where and by who these decisions will be made – especially given that several states objected to the co-facilitators’ idea of asking the UN Secretary-General to provide guidelines. They insisted it should be a decision taken in the intergovernmental space, while failing to use the intergovernmental space provided to them to agree or propose anything clear or workable.
The 2015 High Level Political Forum is now underway at the UN, which from next year onwards is envisaged as the ‘apex’ of the SDG monitoring and review system. It seems unlikely to be able to fulfil such a role in a meaningful way unless real political will and resources are devoted towards that end. Certainly, the HLPF ‘roundtables’ this week don’t offer much promise of reaching decision on a clearer mandate and working method.
The UN, its Member States and civil society have expended unprecedented energy and resources on shaping and deciding this agenda. We must fervently hope that the lack of ambition and political will around review and monitoring signals only a failure of imagination rather than a corresponding (mal)intention to simply neglect the goals and targets as aspirational but ultimately meaningless words on paper. Nevertheless, the lack of robust monitoring and clear lines of accountability will inevitably weaken the efficacy and equity of implementation. For those Member States who want to listen and want to avoid this profoundly wasteful outcome, there are plenty of imaginative, constructive proposals out there for them to be inspired by.
- To learn more about CESR's work on the Sustainable Development Goals, click here.
In 2012, governments agreed at the Rio+20 conference that all decisions on the post-2015 sustainable development agenda would be both consistent with international law and respect the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and respective capabilities. The zero draft of post-2015 agreement, as well as the Open Working Group’s outcomes which preceded it, reiterate their grounding in the UN Charter with full respect for international law, including (implicitly at least) international human rights law. In the latest iteration of the Addis Ababa Accord on financing for development (FfD), meanwhile, governments unambiguously commit to respect all human rights, including the right to development.
This is precisely the question the Center for Economic and Social Rights, in partnership with the Third World Network, attempted to answer in our recent publication, “Universal Rights, Differentiated Responsibilities: Safeguarding human rights beyond borders to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals”. International law—anchored in the UN Charter and various international human rights treaties and jurisprudence—affirms that states have certain human rights duties that extend beyond their own territory.
Though rarely invoked in post-2015 and Financing for Development debates, these ‘extraterritorial’ human rights obligations can shed useful light on current discussions around international cooperation and financing. They provide normative grounding for the commitment to ‘policy coherence’ under SDG 17 on the global partnership for sustainable development, while buttressing the principle of CBDR, reaffirmed since the 1992 yet still so hotly contested by some powerful states in the context of the ongoing post-2015 and financing negotiations.
In our discussions with negotiators and UN agencies, seven common misconceptions tend to cloud the debate about upholding these standing extraterritorial human rights obligations (ETOs) in development practice, thus detracting from the immense potential of invoking these legal standards in this new era of a universal sustainable development agenda.
Misconception 1: Human rights duties are just one among many sets of international legal obligations, and therefore must adjust to the reality of a new economic and geopolitical order.
In point of fact, governments’ obligations under the UN Charter—including those relating to human rights—enjoy primacy over other subsequent international instruments, including bilateral and multilateral trade, investment, double-taxation or other development agreements. Whenever these international economic agreements conflict with states’ pre-existing duties under the UN Charter and international human rights treaties, these economic development agreements must be brought into harmony with human rights, not vice-versa.
Misconception 2: Human rights norms are merely an instrument of aid conditionality, limiting the policy space of poorer countries to meet their legitimate development needs.
Universality cannot mean conditionality. Governments are not permitted under the UN Charter and international law to invoke their extraterritorial obligations to justify undermining the policy space needed by other states to fulfill their domestic human rights commitments. Instead, upholding one’s extraterritorial obligations under international law first and foremost implies assessing and addressing the impacts of the most powerful states and transnational private actors in either constraining or enabling sustainable development. Wealthier and more influential governments, in other words, will have to ensure first and foremost full policy coherence with sustainable development, turning the stale dynamic of North-South conditionality on its head.
Misconception 3: Invoking extraterritorial obligations is a simple ruse to pass the blame to rich countries for what are domestic deficiencies.
Human rights obligations of a domestic and extraterritorial nature are concurrent, not mutually-exclusive, duties. That is, extraterritorial human rights obligations in no way negate state sovereignty or domestic human rights duties, especially in the national implementation of sustainable development plans. States are not permitted, in other words, to invoke the transboundary actions of other states to “pass the blame” and therefore evade their own domestic duties.
Misconception 4: This ETO talk is really just about tapping wealthy countries for more aid.
International human rights law includes a duty of international cooperation and assistance, of which providing financial development assistance is of course a major component. However, the duty is far broader in nature than just supplying aid. It implies an obligation to avoid undermining or nullifying human rights in other countries, and to contribute to an international enabling environment for the full realization of human rights. This duty increases proportionally with the capacity, resources and influence of the state in question. Giving discretionary development assistance, in other words, does not let governments off the hook. Charity cannot offset other actions—such as facilitating egregious tax practices which strip poor governments of development capacity—which undermine human rights overseas.
Misconception 5: Human rights duties don’t apply to decisions governments take within bilateral agreements nor international financial institutions.
Governments can also erode human rights overseas through their bilateral and multilateral conduct, in particular within international and regional institutions. ETOs remain binding no matter how collective a harmful decision may be. While the attribution of state responsibility may be more directly and comprehensively asserted for domestic actions which undermine human rights, states carry their human rights duties into their decision-making conduct within bilateral agreements and international institutions. State responsibility for any human rights harm resulting from multilateral conduct will be by definition shared, yet attributed and delineated based on each government’s respective influence or effective control. In this sense, all governments, but especially those with most influence, must do all they can to ensure international institutions act in consistency with human rights.
Misconception 6: The UN Charter and international human rights law are ill-equipped to address the challenges posed by the enormous influence of transnational business entities.
International law is a thoroughly state-based order. Many decry this as an outdated historic relic of the post-World War II period, in contrast to the power and reach of the market in the 21st century political economy. Yet, the centrality international human rights law gives to states as the primary duty-holder is in useful recognition of the essential role governments must have in driving sustainable development, correcting market failures and protecting human rights and the public good against private interests. Indeed, one of the fundamental duties of government – as reaffirmed in the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights – is to protect people’s human rights against business-related abuses, including those which occur under the banner of ‘sustainable development’ in name only.
Misconception 7: Sustainable development should be about action, not about blaming others. Addressing ETOs is polarizing and will inevitably lead to development paralysis.
Finally, assessing the responsibilities of different development actors over the enjoyment of human rights extraterritorially is not about assigning blame, but instead accounting for the far-ranging and sometimes inadvertent real-world effects of government conduct outside of its borders. Without a sober and evidence-based assessment of the external obstacles countries face, and who is responsible for them, solutions can be only piecemeal and discordant at best.
The Spanish philosopher, José Ortega y Gasset, said way back in 1930, “Every reality unknown prepares its own revenge.” Whatever post-2015 and FfD monitoring and review mechanisms are put into place, it is essential that governments conduct independent assessments of the impact their laws, policies and practices have on the achievement of sustainable development and human rights in other countries. Our briefing illustrates various examples of governments conducting such extraterritorial impact assessments of complex areas such as tax policy. These should be an essential part of ensuring policy coherence in sustainable development.
Remaining knowingly blind to the spillover effects powerful countries have on sustainable development may well undercut the very object and purpose of the post-2015 agenda.
- For more information about ETOs in sustainable development, including all the associated legal sources and ten specific policy implications for the ongoing post-2015 and FfD negotiations, see CESR and TWN, “Universal Rights, Differentiated Responsibilities: Safeguarding human rights beyond borders to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals.”
Kate Donald, Director of CESR's Human Rights in Development program, reflects on recent dynamics in the post-2015 talks.
Member states gathered at the UN from 18-22 May to discuss how they would ’follow-up and review’ progress once implementation of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda begins. For CESR and many others, accountability for the post-2015 commitments has become a core priority, given the stark failures of accountability in the context of the MDGs. As a result, civil society was out in force at the negotiations, keeping pressure on states to agree a monitoring and review architecture that can contribute to more effective, empowering and rights-realizing implementation.
The context is a challenging one, where even the word ‘accountability’ has become controversial. After the co-facilitators queried which terminology to use during the negotiations, the G77 + China group declared that there was no place for ‘monitoring and accountability’ in the post-2015 context, preferring the more anodyne ‘follow-up and review’. However, this does not seem to be a uniform position; some G77 countries did in fact use the taboo ‘A word’ in their public and private remarks. For many, the fear of ‘accountability’ stems not from dislike of the concept of people-state accountability per se, but rather state-to-state accountability; the idea that the new goals could provide an excuse for new avenues of conditionality and paternalistic finger-wagging from rich countries. (For CESR, real accountability should mean nothing of the sort, and indeed we see the post-2015 goals as an opportunity for greater accountability for the role of the developed countries in constraining or enabling sustainable development internationally.) For the EU countries and their allies, ‘monitoring and accountability’ seems to roll off the tongue more comfortably, but their stance is, likewise, far from consistent. In the negotiations building up to the Financing for Development conference in Addis Ababa in July, the EU and other rich countries are firmly resisting moves to create an autonomous body to strengthen follow-up to the FFD measures.
Much of the discussion focused on what kind of process or mechanism would be put in place at the High Level Political Forum to monitor progress at the global level. Various civil society voices (including CESR, Save the Children and the Women’s Major Group) and a number of states urged consideration of a robust peer review process, but on the whole the appetite for anything more than rudimentary was lacking. Instead, states spent a lot of time warning against anything ‘punitive’ or ‘finger-pointing’, and urging a ‘lean not mean’ approach.
Certainly, we need a constructive review process based on collaboration, rather than conditionality or naming-and-shaming; but a process which simply allows states to present reports and little more – without sharing setbacks or allowing for alternative or ‘shadow’ reports – will fall woefully short. To ensure the credibility, ownership and effectiveness of the post-2015 sustainable development agenda, it would be much more worthwhile to commit a little more time and resources - and a lot more political will - to an honest and holistic global monitoring and review process.
The need to use existing monitoring platforms and mechanisms was also a common refrain, and to this end the UN Secretariat put together an overview (which rightly includes the human rights mechanisms, albeit not consistently across all the goals where their recommendations and findings would apply). Making good use of existing thematic mechanisms such as the human rights treaty bodies and the Committee on World Food Security makes good sense in weaving a web of accountability for post-2015 development. However, these entities will need to be strengthened and given the requisite capacity, and in order to avoid MDG-style silos it will be essential to ensure integration and coherence, including through a systematic flow of information between these bodies and the SDG-specific processes.
At the national level, it will also be important to find institutions and mechanisms that can play a ‘bridging role’ between different goal areas, policy spheres, departments and ministries – as well as people and governments. In this regard, the potential value of National Human Rights Institutions was highlighted, including at a side-event co-hosted by CESR, the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, Amnesty International, Center for Reproductive Rights and Human Rights Watch.
Another key gap is the question of corporate accountability. The post-2015 and FFD negotiations are awash with uncritical assumptions about the benefits of private financing for sustainable development, without any reflection on how corporate activity – from resource extraction to tax evasion – can have severely detrimental human rights and environmental impacts. Many civil society groups are speaking up to challenge this misguided consensus, insisting that while the private sector may have an important role to play in sustainable development, there must be safeguards in place.
Speakers at a side-event on this topic discussed the dangers of privatizing public service delivery, drawing on examples from developed and developing countries in the water, health and education sectors, and presented some proposals to regulate corporate activity and increase accountability in the post-2015 context. These included excluding public-private partnerships (PPPs) from the delivery of essential public services, conducting spillover assessments and developing ex-ante criteria to determine the suitability of any specific private sector actor for partnership in pursuit of post-2015 goals. The Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights were also mentioned as an important normative source to be cited in the respective outcome documents, and to guide financing and implementation decisions at the national level. However, it remains to be seen how willing states are to explicitly put people’s rights before corporate profits, and to put meaningful regulation and safeguards in place to this end, especially given the proliferation of free-trade agreements and investor-state dispute settlement mechanisms.
More positively, during the debates all states did accept - at least in principle - that the review processes and mechanisms at all levels must be participatory and inclusive of civil society and the most disadvantaged, marginalized people. The question is how far they will go in implementing these ideals. For an agenda with the imperative to ‘leave no one behind’ at its heart, it is unthinkable that the voices and experiences of the poorest and the most disadvantaged people might be excluded from monitoring and review platforms – which is exactly what will happen if proactive steps (including providing financial resources) are not taken to include them.
The fatal flaw running through development over the last few decades (and one of the main reasons we’ve seen many so-called development projects violating rather than realizing rights) has been the failure to prioritize and enable true participation, or to ensure that those who hold the power and purse-strings are held accountable. It would be a tragic waste if the SDGs were to repeat the same mistakes.
By Kate Donald, Director of CESR's Human Rights in Development Program
In order for the post-2015 agenda to be rights-realizing and effective, it will need to include a meaningful recognition of globalization and the importance of global-level actions, governance, systems and institutions. The potential of actions or omissions in this arena to severely undermine efforts at national levels is just too stark. This is long overdue, given that the Millennium Declaration posited “the central challenge we face today is to ensure that globalization becomes a positive force for all the world’s people.”
Unfortunately, since 2000 the ‘long crisis of globalization’ has only deepened, manifested in economic, social and ecological crises including financial shocks and austerity; deepening inequality; and rampant environmental degradation and climate change. All of these have had a severely detrimental effect on human rights enjoyment, with the poorest and most socially excluded people both within and across countries suffering most.
This week, Member States at the United Nations HQ in New York have been discussing how the post-2015 sustainable development agenda will be implemented and, in particular, financed. This is a very big question indeed, given that the SDGs are likely to require resources of over a trillion dollars per year. It is a divisive issue and the political crux of the entire post-2015 agenda: developing countries (134 of which form the ‘G77 plus China’ bloc) are unlikely to commit to implementation unless there are meaningful financial commitments on the table from the richer countries. The legacy of the Millennium Development Goals is in some ways a bitter one: low-income countries feeling that the MDGs left all the hard work to them, while the wealthy countries were not obliged to cut poverty in their own countries, nor were they held to their commitments to provide funds to the developing world and ensure a global policy environment conducive to development.
Universal rights, differentiated responsibilities
All States – no matter what their GDP – have a common responsibility to allocate the maximum of their available resources to realizing the economic, social and cultural rights of people in their territory, and to do so without discrimination. However, rich countries have additional and special responsibilities for financing sustainable development beyond their borders, as part of their human rights obligation of international assistance and cooperation (enshrined in several major human rights treaties and the UN Charter). In particular, extra-territorial human rights obligations can serve as a useful yardstick to assess whether governments are upholding their common but differentiated obligations across all sustainable development dimensions. (See CESR and Third World Network’s new briefing Universal Rights, Differentiated Responsibilities) This is a legal duty and also a moral one: not just because they have the means to help, but also because they have often arrived at this wealth by exploiting the resources of the poorer countries –including in the present day through exploitative and unfair international tax and trade rules. Every year developing countries lose many times more to illicit financial flows (most of which benefits individuals and corporations in the Global North with access to tax havens and expensive accountants) than they gain via aid (official development assistance).
In order to make a new sustainable development agenda possible, rich countries will have to recognize their special and differentiated responsibility, by stepping up with concrete financial commitments. This starts with honouring longstanding pledges to dedicate at least 0.7% of GNI to ODA (which only a very few countries have so far done), in addition to dedicated climate finance. But there are many other measures they will have to take to gain the trust and partnership of the G77, as well as to meet the demands of civil society. These include commitments to fairer international tax rules, forgiveness of odious foreign debt, tackling illicit financial flows (for example by shutting down the tax havens they preside over), overhauling the trade and debt regimes, and reforming the undemocratic structures of global economic governance that profoundly disadvantage developing countries. Taken together, such measures could mobilize well over $1.5 trillion for sustainable development.
Accountability for the global partnership
It is not enough to merely make these pledges on paper. After all, the MDGs included provisions for ‘the global partnership for development’ (MDG8), but this languished neglected at the level of rhetoric - hamstrung in particular by lack of clear responsibility and accountability. We simply cannot afford another political commitment to ‘partnership’ between developed and developing countries that is more about window-dressing than real change. In order to go beyond this, we must learn the lessons of the MDGs and put in place robust follow-up, monitoring and accountability for the ‘global partnership’, as an integral part of the post-2015 agenda and FFD commitments.
The first step towards such accountability will be measurable, time-bound commitments with clear lines of responsibility, which should be affirmed at both the July FFD conference in Addis Ababa and at the September Post-2015 Summit in September. But the second and likely even bigger challenge will be to create channels, mechanisms and forums to foster real accountability for those commitments.
Next month, States will discuss the ‘follow-up and review’ of the post-2015 agenda in New York. It is crucial that the monitoring mechanisms and accountability architecture decided have the mandate to cover the responsibility of donor countries under the global partnership (housed under Goal 17). In particular, the High-Level Political Forum should be given a meaningful role (and the necessary time and resources) to review the state of the global partnership at the international level, and to ask individual States to answer for their role in it. This would include not only the extent to which they are fulfilling their direct commitments to finance sustainable development overseas, but also the more indirect ways in which their policies and actions may be helping or hindering progress beyond their borders. One practical way in which States can take responsibility in this regard is to conduct ‘spillover assessments’ of the impact of their tax policies and agreements (for example with regard to corporate taxation) on the achievement of human rights and sustainable development goals in other countries. There is also a strong push now for an autonomous follow-up mechanism specifically for the Financing for Development process, which could be another important step towards cross-border accountability for sustainable development financing.
For both political and substantive reasons, the ‘global partnership’ between countries to finance and implement sustainable development is arguably the most important piece of the post-2015 puzzle. If we don’t want to waste this opportunity, we must concentrate not only on securing clear, concrete financing commitments, but also focus strenuous efforts on ensuring multiple channels for meaningful monitoring of these promises. The only ‘partnership’ worth having is one that is transparent, equitable, and accountable to those it purports to serve – otherwise it is not a partnership at all.
- Universal Rights, Differentiated Responsibilities: Safeguarding human rights beyond borders to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals
- Accountability for the Post-2015 Development Agenda: A Proposal for a Robust Global Review Mechanism
- Who Will be Accountable?
- A Post-2015 Fiscal Revolution
- Indicators for a Post-2015 Fiscal Revolution
- Beyond 2015 Accountability Position Paper: Implementing the Ambition
Posted by Kate Donald on April 23rd, 2015
Last month, the UN Secretary-General released his long-awaited post-2015 ‘Synthesis Report’ – so called because it was expected to bring together and harmonize the many disparate strands of the post-2015 process. Arguably, expectations were too high. The Secretary-General’s report was always going to be one among many inputs, and not even the most important (that honor goes to the Open Working Group outcome document, which has been confirmed as the basis for the intergovernmental negotiations that start next week). Many people were hopeful that Ban Ki-moon would make a pitch for a tighter, shorter list of goals than the 17 produced by the OWG; at least as many groups were concerned that he give conclusive, definitive backing to the full array. (In the end, he did both and neither simultaneously, applauding the OWG outcome document but noting the possibility of grouping or ‘rearranging’ the goals more concisely.) What everyone wanted was a powerful narrative and clear vision from the SG about the SDGs and their purpose; a catchy, inspirational way of framing and communicating the goals; and more fleshed-out proposals for how the post-2015 commitments would be implemented and monitored in practice.
Kate Donald, director of the Human Rights in Development program at CESR, reflects on the strengths and weaknesses of a recent milestone report on the post-2015 process.
On all these fronts, the report was a mixed bag. There was plenty of inspirational and ambitious language about the need for a ‘transformational’ and universal post-2015 agenda, which will remind Member States of the pressure on them to agree on something far-reaching and decidedly not ‘business-as-usual’ in 2015.
In many ways, the language and content on human rights is very good. Far more so than the OWG outcome, Ban explicitly acknowledges that human rights must be one of the foundations on which post-2015 efforts are built (“Human development is also the respect of human rights”). The report is uncompromising in its assertion that these must abide by and not fall below existing obligations under international law (which of course includes human rights law). However, in other ways the report felt like a missed opportunity to showcase concrete examples of how human rights should play out in sustainable development. After many years of the human rights-based approach to development being a core policy of the UN system, this shouldn’t be too much to ask from the Secretary-General. Instead, the human rights content remains at the level of normative framing and baselines.
The centerpiece of the report is the ‘six essential elements for delivering on the SDGs’: dignity, prosperity, justice, partnership, planet and people:
Ban insisted when presenting the report that this was not an attempt to ‘cluster’ the OWG’s 17 goals, but it was hard to understand what it added instead. In fact, the six ‘elements’ arguably somewhat detract from from the three ‘dimensions’ of sustainable development – environmental, economic and social– as well as from the human rights framework, which could have itself provided a stronger and preexisting framing device. The report makes an attempt to include all the OWG target areas in this SDG ‘wheel’, but the divisions feel somewhat arbitrary and in fact many priorities were missed or underplayed. Gender equality and women’s rights, for example, is reduced to a sub-headline of ‘inclusion of women and children’, and there is no real acknowledgement of the urgency of women's full political, social and economic equality as a pre-requisite for sustainable development and as a human rights imperative in and of itself. In some cases the language on women’s rights is weaker than in the OWG outcome document – for example on violence against women – and key issues such as unpaid care work don’t even merit a mention. (It’s interesting to note that the advance version published in December was missing a reference even to sexual health, but the final version hews exactly to the language of the OWG, calling for realization of women’s “sexual and reproductive health and reproductive rights”.)
Tackling inequality has been repeatedly expressed as a huge post-2015 priority of civil society, and had enough buy-in from States to merit its own goal and targets in the OWG outcome document. However, inequality gets somewhat lost in the framing of the Synthesis report (subsumed under the ‘dignity’ element) - and therefore emerges with its place in the hierarchy of priorities somewhat weakened moving into the negotiations. Strong political commitments from both developed and developing countries to meaningfully tackle inequality could be a truly transformational legacy of the post-2015 agenda – but this is by no means a safe bet, and therefore the Secretary-General’s failure to trumpet its importance more forcefully may well turn out to be a strategic error. On the other hand, it is heartening to see ‘Justice’ given prominence as one of the six elements – underlining that good governance, accountable institutions and freedoms of expression and assembly are a core element of sustainable development (mirroring the indivisibility of civil & political and economic, social & cultural rights), making it harder for States to back away from including commitments in these areas.
The report places a welcome emphasis on two areas which are crucial for the success and integrity of the post-2015 agenda – accountability and financing. The Secretary-General should be applauded for dedicating a whole section of the report to “Monitoring, evaluation and reporting”, making a strong case for embedding monitoring and accountability mechanisms in the new framework. However, the report frequently falls back on watered down ideas about voluntary ‘reporting’ and ‘knowledge-sharing’, which may have value in themselves but should not be conflated with real accountability (which, as we argued in Who Will be Accountable, encompasses responsibility, answerability and enforceability). This is particularly the case with the proposals for the regional and global mechanisms. Some more concrete ideas about how to operationalize accountability at these levels – in particular how to make the mechanisms meaningful, mandatory and capable of monitoring cross-border impacts of policies - would have been a valuable contribution, especially given the report’s acknowledgement of the importance of global governance, policy coherence and international cooperation in achieving the SDGs. While Ban’s vision of national accountability processes is far more robust, it presupposes a conducive environment for such national reviews “with broad, multi-stakeholder participation” – when in reality we know that in many countries civil society organizations are faced with diminishing resources and restricted political freedom.
On the financing front, it is encouraging to see repeated reference to the importance of tackling tax evasion and illicit financial flows (“effectively addressing illicit flows is urgent”), and reforming tax systems to raise public revenue more equitably. Unsurprisingly given the current enthusiasm for partnerships among UN agencies and Member States, the Secretary-General does grant a major role to the private sector; but happily he does also include some reasonably strong language on regulation, mandatory reporting, safeguards and accountability for private finance in sustainable development – and cites the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights as a key standard. While this falls short of the ex ante human rights assessments of potential private sector partners called for by the Human Rights Caucus and others, it at least flags the potential risks and the need for vigilance and protections.
In conclusion, the Synthesis Report offers plenty of positives to build on. The integration of human rights is certainly more meaningful than in other official SDG inputs, and it presents a robust survey of where we are in the process and what proposals are on the table, with some subtle nudges in more progressive directions. However, the achievement is somewhat overshadowed by a couple of regrettable missteps, where it feels like Ban missed his chance to really throw his weight behind certain overarching but politically vulnerable priorities and to frame the discussion in a more human rights-based way. Ultimately, however, the definition of the post-2015 agenda is down to Member States, with the intergovernmental negotiations kicking off next week the first real test of their commitment to a truly transformative paradigm shift. The challenge for civil society is to continue pushing forcefully for a high level of ambition, participation and accountability in all aspects of the new sustainable development framework.
Posted by Kate Donald on January 13th, 2015
Subjected to scrutiny, the data ‘revolution’ has always seemed more like savvy branding than an accurate description of any actual phenomenon. As one commentator has wryly observed, “the data revolution may be the first revolution in history not to feature any people”. Nevertheless, since being heralded in the report of the High-Level Panel on the Post-2015 Sustainable Development Agenda, the idea of the data ‘revolution’ has been taken up with great enthusiasm. Recently, it was further enshrined and elucidated in the report of the UN Secretary General’s Independent Expert Advisory Group (IEAG) on the Data Revolution, ‘A World That Counts’.
Our experience of human rights monitoring has underlined the difficulties in assessing progress or backsliding in human rights enjoyment without the right kinds of data and information being collected and made available. This is a pressing challenge across many different contexts. In our work on tax and human rights for example, we share the frustration of many economists and tax justice campaigners at the dearth of accurate information on illicit financial flows, tax evasion, beneficial ownership and corporate tax incentives. We know that economic inequality is growing worldwide, but in fact the scale of this inequality is still underestimated, because much of the wealth of the top 1% is hidden. Similarly, although it is easy to observe that gender inequality is rife, we still lack good data illuminating how resources are shared within households, or how a nation’s tax burden is shared between women and men. Meanwhile, millions of people worldwide are absent from official records and from official accounts of progress (because they are marginalized or hard to reach), and are therefore denied their rights. This might not only lead us to underestimate these inequalities and their root causes, but also blind us to some potentially important policy solutions.
More positively, we felt it was important to share insights derived from our work on monitoring public policies from a rights perspective (for example in Guatemala). Despite the challenges outlined above, in recent years CESR and other human rights advocates have developed creative methods for using available socio-economic data and applying it to human rights questions, while experiences of human rights monitoring show that it is possible to analyze progress in many areas of development traditionally thought of as unquantifiable, such as accountable governance.
Despite the woefully inadequate time window for civil society consultation on the IEAG’s report, the exercise did demonstrate the importance of seeking this feedback, as the final report was a significant improvement on the draft. In particular, the final report addressed some of the concerns CESR and others expressed by exhibiting a greater sensitivity to and more nuanced understanding of human rights. It acknowledges that “human rights cut across many issues relevant to the data revolution”. This was in contrast to the draft, which had a narrow vision of the relationship between rights and the data revolution in which the latter could negatively threaten the former - understood mostly as privacy rights. It also states that any institutions, mechanisms or partnerships set up to mobilize or regulate the data revolution must respect, protect and fulfill human rights. In addition, the authors introduced the importance of supporting and investing in civil society’s ability to collect, use and analyze data; the need to prioritize gathering data on especially vulnerable and marginalized populations and on various grounds of discrimination and inequality; and the need for national statistical offices to be more transparent and establish more links with the public.
The report still has considerable weaknesses (see here for one analysis). From our perspective, the most pressing of these is the report’s complacent assumption that data will improve accountability (“data are… the raw material for accountability”), without exploring the necessary stepping stones. How will ordinary citizens use this data to seek progress, justice and redress? For example, accessible accountability mechanisms will need to be in place, and these mechanisms - such as courts and human rights bodies - need capacity-building to be able to use and analyze data more effectively. In addition, more robust language overall on government transparency – the State’s duty to actively provide all relevant information to its people, including on budgets, financial and tax policies – would have been welcome. Right to information laws don’t even get a mention.
The experience of the MDGs has taught us that what can be measured and quantified gets more political attention - and more funding. High-quality accessible data – combined with important shifts in how we collect and use it - could certainly play a role in improving human rights enjoyment, empowerment and accountability. For instance, a meaningful commitment in the post-2015 sustainable development goals to tackle inequalities and leave no one behind, combined with data systems that can really pinpoint who is being excluded, and the extent and nature of their deprivation, could be a major step towards tackling these unacceptable disparities within and between countries . However, transformative change is still ultimately a question of political will and power. We must not be seduced by the idea that data is a quick fix to solve global poverty and inequality. This misconception may partly explain the enthusiasm for the ‘data revolution’ in policy and development circles – it gives us the false comfort that perhaps it is all about stats and numbers after all, rather than messy politics and real human beings in all their complexity. Data does not equal empowerment, and it does not inevitably result in accountability, as the report seems to suggest. No amount of data is going to overcome the thorny and very contextual development challenges we face, and it can certainly never be a substitute for really engaging with communities and ensuring they have the means to challenge development injustices. Posted by Kate Donald on November 24th, 2014
We are at a crossroads in defining the future of sustainable development. Over the summer, UN member states hashed out some agreement on a proposed set of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and targets, and simultaneously devised a ‘menu of options’ for financing these universal goals. The UN Secretary General’s office is at the grind now to synthesize these proposals and many more into a workable set of recommendations for what the post-2015 sustainable development framework could and should look like.
Unless governments agree to concrete tax and budgetary commitments which ensure robust, equitable and accountable fiscal foundations for sustainable development, the SDGs will end up merely dead letters.
Why is fiscal justice—that is, ensuring the sufficiency, equality and accountability of financing—so central to delivering sustainable development? Much more money will need to be mobilized for sustainable development—on the order of a trillion dollars a year. According to our recent findings, a range of complementary domestic and global fiscal commitments—from ending harmful corporate income tax exemptions, to boosting financial transparency to taxing illicit financial flows and carbon emissions to name just a few—can unleash at least US$1.5 trillion per year in additional, stable and predictable public funding to end poverty, inequality and environmental destruction.
Equality in the burdens and benefits of sustainable development financing within and between countries meanwhile is as important as the total amount raised. “Collecting taxes is not enough,” as the Head of the Uruguayan Tax Collection Agency recently said, “what matters is how and from whom.” Concrete post-2015 commitments to reduce economic inequality within countries through enhanced use of progressive taxation on income and wealth, while simultaneously augmenting investments in marginalized regions and amongst disadvantaged groups would provide a needed boost to reducing corrosive levels of socio-economic inequality in all countries.
Lastly, robust and truly equitable fiscal policy—as any government official or budget analyst would say—is inherently vulnerable to being undermined by politics. At the heart of many development financing challenges lie stark imbalances of (public and private) power in domestic and trans-national decision-making over how resources are raised and spent. Good intentions are not enough to push back against this potent driver of political and economic inequality. Ensuring poor and disadvantaged communities have the right to access timely, accessible and relevant fiscal information, enabling effective and meaningful participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of budget, tax and fiscal policy and ensuring effective remedy for fiscal harms is thus a third essential pre-condition for an effective sustainable development financing strategy.
The struggle for fiscal justice post-2015 won’t be easy, and will need all the help it can get. So, how might existing human rights standards and accountability mechanisms help overcome some of the obstacles to ensure robust, equitable and accountable fiscal foundations for sustainable development?
First, ensuring adequate public funding for sustainable development will require a step-change in international cooperation. While some of the proposed targets (say boosting the capacity of public revenue authorities) could be acted on by states individually, the grand majority of the actions needed to ensure sufficient resources for sustainable development will require concerted action by many governments North and South. Poor countries could commit to a universal domestic resource floor of 20% tax/GDP by 2020, for example, but this would be unachievable in most cases while the finances flowing in and out of their countries remain illicit, and the countries benefitting from the current system refuse to propose collective sanctions for private and public actors refusing to cooperate cross-border tax abuses, let alone conduct spillover analyses of the impact of their tax practices on sustainable development.
Despite varied attempts to obfuscate the facts, several human rights treaties do indeed require by law that governments cooperate internationally, commensurate with their capacities, resources and influence. These legal duties—founded in the UN Charter and other key sources of international law—imply that governments must collaborate with, and not undermine, other governments’ efforts to mobilize the maximum of available resources for human rights and sustainable development. Government laws and policies which have the effect of preventing other countries from resourcing rights in equitable ways (e.g. supporting cross-border tax evasion, improper regulation of abusive private financial actors, private creditors or other business enterprises, aid or trade conditionalities, and unjustifiable constraints on deficit financing) clearly work against the achievement of human rights and sustainable development goals. In this way, human rights can help recast the basic principles of the global tax regime away from tax competition and systemic regulatory arbitrage towards international cooperation and equality before the law.
A second key obstacle to ensuring the SDGs actually deliver fiscal justice, pointed out most recently by Alex Cobham, is the resistance from some quarters to including specific fiscal policy measures and national responsibilities as targets or indicators in themselves. National ownership of sustainable development is essential for legitimate and lasting progress. Yet, tackling global fiscal challenges will be impossible without making clear who should do what, and who will be ultimately accountable if global fiscal commitments (such as on “reducing illicit financial flows by x%’) are not achieved. Without including specific needed policy efforts (on beneficial ownership of companies, trusts and foundations; automatic tax information exchange; mandatory fiscal policy spillover analyses, to name a few), the outcome-oriented targets will remain nebulous, elusive and ultimately un-delivered. Human rights standards, in this context, impose obligations of conduct as well as of result. Governments in other words are accountable not only for the outcomes they achieve but for the policy efforts they make, supporting the case that the targets and indicators used to measure sustainable development, especially on fiscal policy—should be policy-sensitive as well as outcome-oriented.
Effective fiscal accountability remains another challenge which can be more fully addressed through recourse to human rights. While on the surface it might seem that the struggle over whether or not to include SDG targets on political participation, freedom of assembly, right to information and access to justice are far afield from financing development, these fundamental human rights lay at the very foundation of fair fiscal policy. Fiscal accountability—characterized by the right to access timely, accessible and relevant fiscal information, meaningful and organized participation in the design, implementation and monitoring of fiscal policy, and the provision of effective remedies for fiscal harms—is a key determinant in strengthening tax compliance and tax morale and essential to ultimately carrying through on promised development commitments. What’s more, it is a human rights imperative. As such, an array of human rights mechanisms—from constitutional courts to national human rights commissions to UN treaty bodies—are being increasingly invoked , particularly in the context of the economic crisis and austerity. These human rights bodies have a still-untapped potential to protect peoples’ fundamental rights to transparency, information, participation and accountability in fiscal policy decisions at all levels.
Lastly, framing fiscal justice as a human rights issue takes it beyond the elite technocratic sphere into the arena of legitimate public scrutiny, debate and mobilization around fundamental values of equality, solidarity and justice. This can help not only check the near-hegemonic influence of private interests over tax policy, but also broaden the platform to a broader range of social actors not yet engaged in tax advocacy, such as budget analysts, corporate accountability campaigners, social movements, litigators and academics. Sustained alliance-building will be required in the coming years to turn human rights principles into a coherent, universal and enforceable body of fiscal policy standards, respected in practice by governments, international institutions, multinational businesses and their advisers/financiers.
Financing sustainable development adequately, equitably and accountably remains a significant challenge which the UN post-2015 agenda and next year’s Financing for Development conference in Addis Ababa is well-placed to address. Far from a political lightning rod, human rights standards and mechanisms can be dynamic tools in this struggle.
This article, originally written for the Righting Finance Initiative, was adapted from the author’s presentation at the event, “Human rights and tax policies in the post-2015 development agenda: Towards a transformative partnership?” on June 16th 2014 at UN Headquarters.
Posted by Niko Lusiani on September 10th, 2014
Human rights continue to take centre stage at UN discussions over the future of global development. Thousands of civil society organizations from all over the world gathered for a major conference at the UN headquarters in New York have issued a strong call for human rights to be at the heart of the sustainable development agenda to be agreed next year.
In light of the tense debates around human rights at the July session of the Open Working Group, which produced a draft of the Sustainable Development Goals for negotiation over the coming year, the NGO Declaration reaffirms that human rights cannot be compromised nor considered up for negotiation. “Our rights cannot be questioned, traded, or violated. Along with economic, social, cultural and environmental rights, any successor framework must include commitments to protect freedom of association, expression, assembly and political participation if it is to ensure an enabling environment for an empowered civil society.”
Reflecting inputs by CESR and other members of the Post-2015 Human Righs Caucus, the Declaration includes strong language on the need for rigorous monitoring and accountability arrangements, firmly rooted in human rights standards and mechanisms. Echoing the recommendations in a recent briefing by CESR and Christian Aid on the Post-2015 Fiscal Revolution, the Declaration stresses that these arrangements must address accountability for fiscal policy, including taxation, so as to ensure that sufficiency and equitable distribution of resources for development. In light of the SDG’s emphasis on development partnerships with the private sector, the Declaration calls for greater commitments to hold business more accountable through legislative, regulatory and mandatory impact assessments.
At the conference, CESR’s Executive Director, Ignacio Saiz, moderated a roundtable on ‘Human Rights: (Really) Leaving No One Behind’, which assessed progress and challenges in integrating human rights and equality perspectives in the SDG process so far. Speakers from the Kenyan grassroots women’s rights movement, the International Disability Alliance, the International Labor Organization, Lawyers with Borders, the UN Secretary General’s Envoy on Youth and the Netherlands mission highlighted the need to ensure explicit inclusion and meaningful participation of groups facing poverty and discrimination in the SDG content and process, the importance of a holistic approach to human rights embracing social, economic, civil, political and environmental dimensions, and the need for advocates working on different dimensions of human rights to work in closer coordination.
To this end, CESR has led the creation of a Human Rights Post-2015 Caucus as a space to share strategies, coordinate joint interventions and amplify the human rights voice in post-2015 debates. Co-convened by CESR with Amnesty International and the Association for Women’s Rights in Development (AWID), the Caucus has issued a ‘Human Rights Litmus Test’ to assess whether proposals for the SDGs meet the essential requirements of human rights standards and principles.
As the NGO conference declaration highlights, continued civil society engagement in the ongoing SDG negotiations and related processes is critical. Yet there are well-founded concerns that this will be contested and increasingly restricted at both the national and global levels. The strong affirmation at the DPI conference that human rights must be made central to the sustainable development agenda, and the increasingly coordinated efforts of human rights groups to bring about this goal, are important steps forward in ensuring that the gains made in the process so far are not compromised but built on in negotiations over the coming months.
Posted by Luke Holland on August 31st, 2014
As the High-Level Political Forum on Sustainable Development (HLPF) meets at the UN’s New York headquarters, CESR has weighed in on one of the most critical and contentious issues on its agenda; accountability.
The HLPF, a new body established under the Rio+20 outcome document, has been set up to monitor and review implementation of the new sustainable development commitments to be agreed in 2015. While the question of accountability is just one of a number of difficult challenges it must address between now and July 9, when its second round of meetings draws to a close, past experience has shown that development commitments mean little if they are not backed up with effective accountability mechanisms.
CESR’s Luke Holland, speaking at a morning session with civil society hosted by the President of the Economic and Social Council, outlined five essential characteristics of an effective post-2015 monitoring and accountability framework.
The success or failure of future development efforts hinges on whether all development actors are held accountable to their human rights obligations under a truly universal framework. Governments must be held accountable to the commitments they make, both to their own citizens and to each other, as part of a new Global Partnership for Development. And with the private sector playing an ever-increasing role in development processes, it is likewise essential that corporations be held to their human rights responsibilities, as set out in the Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights.
Moreover, if the HLPF is to become an effective catalyst for just and transformative development, it should be at the center of a multi-layered ecosystem of accountability in which a broad spectrum of mechanisms, spanning the global, regional, national and local levels, work in synergy. New mechanisms specific to the sustainable development goals should work in complementarity with existing accountability systems, including parliamentary, judicial and administrative bodies.
Real accountability must also be people-centered, which means creating enabling conditions of citizens’ participation, both around the HLPF itself and in other monitoring and accountability processes set up at the national and regional levels. These voices must be heard and acted upon. The HLPF can also support meaningful participation by promoting participatory processes at the national level, and spurring access to data and information, At a time when freedom of expression, association and information are under attack in many countries, these issues are more pressing than ever.
Similarly, the HLPF must deliver transformative accountability. Given that reporting to the Forum will be voluntary, it is all the more important that review processes are rigorous, interrogating policy efforts, resource allocations and international commitments, and ensuring corrective action where necessary.
Taken together, these elements represent the difference between an accountability system that is merely ceremonial, and one that is genuinely rights-based. Human rights offer a universal, multi-layered, people-centred framework for transformative accountability. By anchoring the SDG accountability framework in human rights, the HLPF can powerfully incentivise the achievement of the goals, and thereby ensure they do not go down in history as another set of unfulfilled promises.Posted by Luke Holland on July 7th, 2014
CESR's Executive Director, Ignacio Saiz, spoke at the Inter-Active Dialogue on Elements for a Monitoring and Accountability Framework for a Post-2015 Agenda convened by the President of the General Assembly on 1 May at the UN headquarters in New York. Contributing to the opening panel on "Concepts for a new accountability framework", chaired by the Secretary General´s Special Adviser on Post-2015, Amina Mohammed, Ignacio argued that the post-2015 accountability architecture should be grounded in human rights principles, and buttressed by human rights accountability mechanisms.
Speaking to the findings of CESR's in-depth study, Who Will Be Accountable? Human Rights and the Post-2015 Development Agenda, published with the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in 2013, he spelled out how human rights could reinforce the three constituent elements of accountability: responsibility, answerability and enforceability. Human rights standards can help clarify the differentiated responsibilities of states and other actors on the development stage. They set out the freedoms and capabilities that must be safeguarded if those in power are to answer to those facing poverty and deprivation. And a range of human rights enforcement mechanisms at the national, regional and international levels can act as avenues for accountability in the development sphere.
While highlighting the role that existing administrative, legislative and judicial mechanisms can play as part of a new ecosystem of accountability, Ignacio highlighted the need for more effective instruments to hold wealthier states, international institutions and the private sector answerable for the human rights and environmental impacts of their policies and practices, as these had proven the biggest accountability gaps under the MDGs.
The event was addressed by UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, who called for an inclusive, robust yet flexible framework whereby all actors could be accountable for honouring their commitments. Speaking on a second panel on "Learning from existing review mechanisms", the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Navi Pillay, spoke of the need to ensure an enabling environment for accountability, and of the positive lessons that could be learnt from the Universal Periodic Review of the UN Human Rights Council. The meeting heard from other civil society advocates, including Roberto Bissio from Social Watch, who said that accountability is only meaningful if the powerful countries, intergovernmental institutions and transnational corporations can be brought to account.
These points were echoed in the interventions of some of the member states present. For example, Bolivia, speaking on behalf of the G77 (the largest grouping at the UN) said that a central feature of the accountability framework should be to ensure developing countries are enabled to achieve their objectives, through capacity building, technology transfer and more effective development cooperation. Accountability and mechanisms for delivering can be expected to remain a controversial issue in negotiations going forward, however. These issues will continue to be debated via a new thematic consultation convened by UNICEF and UN Women, with the support of Peru, South Korea and Canada.
- Ignacio's statement to the Inter-Active Dialogue is available here.
- The video of the meeting is available here, with Ignacio's presentation beginning at 1 hour 6 minutes.
- A recent joint civil society statement on human rights and the post-2015 development agenda can be found here.
- For more on CESR´s work on human rights and accountability in the SDGs, see here.
Posted by Luke Holland on May 7th, 2014
After a lengthy process of consultation and deliberation, talks over the post-2015 sustainable development agenda are now moving into the cut and thrust of practical negotiation. As the process enters this more overtly political phase, there is a very real threat that the voice of powerful actors, especially those from the private sector, may drown out global civil society’s demands for a human rights-based framework, and with it the possibility of a genuinely transformative agenda.
At key UN meetings last week in Helsinki and this week in New York, debates intensified on the role of public-private partnerships in the future sustainable development framework. Many governments, along with leading figures from the corporate sphere, are pushing hard for the private sector to be placed in the driving seat. In an age of deepening political and economic inequality worldwide, shifting the already-skewed balance of power even further towards such private actors would dramatically undermine the chances of a just and sustainable development agenda with human rights at its core, however.
The experience of the last few decades suggests that the types of legal or policy incentives in the playbook for boosting an investor-friendly environment--tax holidays and exemptions, weakened labor and environmental protections, abusive stability and investment clauses, risk guarantees, increased lobbying influence on public policy, biased market liberalization and deregulation, especially in the financial sector– are precisely some of the same policy instruments which have undercut the foundations for sustainable development, driven deeper inequality and undermined human rights and the environment.
Without a clear-eyed assessment of the real risks of privatizing post-2015 and strong regulatory provisions to prevent them, corporate capture of the post-2015 process threatens the key human rights principle of accountability, which will be crucial to any development framework that is truly inclusive. In years gone by, transnational corporate power has all too often used its influence to avoid accountability rather than bolster it. What’s more, rather than furthering the cause of just development and human rights, multinational corporations have frequently been involved in human rights abuses themselves. This has taken place both directly, through the activities of the extractive sector for example, and indirectly, through tax avoidance and policy manipulation.
With only months leftbefore the new sustainable development framework is agreed, civil society is rallying to wrest control of the post-2015 process from the hands of corporations and return it to where it belongs – under the purview of capable and legitimate governments acting in transparent and democratic multilateral forums and in close partnership with civil society.
Throughout the past week, organizations from around the world urged UN member states to reaffirm their role as primary protectors and guarantors of human rights rather than mere enablers of private sector development. At both official sessions and civil society side events this week, advocates from Brazil, India, and Uruguay exposed the realities of power imbalances and conflicts of interests inherent in private sector-led development partnerships. In a statement to the Helsinki meeting issued by the Righting Finance Initiative, CESR and allies proposed a clear set of ex ante criteria to guarantee primacy of a public post-2015 process and to determine under what conditions private sector actors are fit to be post-2015 partners. These criteria should examine, at the least:
- whether the private actor has a history or current status of serious allegations of abusing human rights or the environment, including in their cross-border activities;
- whether the private actor has a proven track record (or the potential to) deliver on sustainable development commitments emerging from the post-2015 process;
- whether the private actor has previous involvement in acts of corruption with government officials;
- whether the private actor is fully transparent in its financial reporting and fully respecting existing tax responsibilities in all countries it operates, and not undermining sustainable development through tax avoidance;
- any conflicts of interest in order to eliminate potential private donors whose activities are antithetical or contradictory to the UN Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the SDG framework.
Some governments are beginning to speak out against the growing corporate capture of the sustainable development agenda. Speaking at the civil society side-event, “Privatization of the post-2015 Development Agenda”, co-sponsored by CESR in New York earlier this week, Sergio Rodrigues from Brazil´s Permanent Mission to the UN warned that corporate influence over the post-2015 process could determine the future of the development agenda for years to come. He cautioned that this debate was at its core a battle over the future of the UN itself, and confirmed that his government would be among those pushing for stronger mechanisms of accountability and guidelines to regulate corporate engagement in development partnerships.
There is no doubt that the private sector does have an important role to play in driving economic dynamism and a healthy job market, but it is only when such profit-seeking activity is balanced by a strong and stable regulatory and accountability frameworks, on a level playing field and in equal partnership with the other actors involved, that we can realistically expect it to contribute to the world we all need.
Indeed, as many advocates reflect on the week past, it’s an open question whether the UN as an institution could ever recover from the reputational shock of its new chief private financiers being simultaneously the chief violators of its most cherished principles.
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The Rio+20 conference on Sustainable Development was originally intended to achieve consensus on a framework for sustainable and just global development. As the conference draws to a conclusion in the eponymous Brazilian city, the only consensus in evidence is that the international community has once again failed to reach a meaningful agreement, despite the critical importance of the event for current and future generations.
‘The Future We Want’ was the slogan on banners promoting the meeting, but the resulting outcome document is unlikely to deliver anything on this worthy promise. The agreement appears to have sacrificed a swathe of key human rights and social justice concerns, prompting former High Commissioner for Human Rights Mary Robinson to brand it a ‘failure of leadership’. While commitments to certain economic and social rights, including food, water, education and health were ‘reaffirmed’ in the document, language on the critical issues of transparency and accountability is far too weak to ensure these affirmations translate into meaningful change. References to freedom of speech and association have meanwhile been omitted altogether.
Disagreement between various countries over how the costs of sustainable development should be borne, and by whom, has effectively blocked agreement on a more ambitious plan that could provide for the needs of the current generation, without undermining the ability of future generations to provide for their needs too. Against a backdrop of multiple crises, widening inequality and potentially catastrophic environmental degradation, the international community faces a moral and political imperative to find a way past this deadlock. Indeed, as UN Secretary General Ban-Ki Moon recently warned, the world runs the risk of sabotaging its future if it does not rise to this challenge.
The agreement hammered out in Rio does not mark the end of the road, however. As the dust settles on what has been a largely disappointing event from the point of view of social justice advocates, governments at the meeting have at least committed to creating a set of sustainable development goals (SDGs). If this new framework is to succeed in shifting the world onto a fairer and more sustainable development path, it is of fundamental importance that it be grounded in human rights.
Past experience has made it abundantly clear that the failure to include human rights norms and principles into international development frameworks can lead to the most fundamental rights of vulnerable groups being undermined rather than promoted. Development-induced pollution of air, soil and water resources all too often leads to people’s rights to health, housing, food, water and even life being put at risk. CESR’s work in countries such as Ecuador has illustrated the devastating impact irresponsible business activities can have on both human rights and the environment. Indigenous peoples’ land rights are often trampled on in the rush to exploit resources, while forced evictions are carried out to clear the ground for infrastructure projects and biofuel production displaces traditional agriculture, thereby threatening the right to food.
The integration of human rights norms and standards into development plans can not only avert such lamentable outcomes, but also ensure that the fruits of development are more fairly distributed while also protecting the environment. Proper participation mechanisms, in accordance with the provisions of international human rights law, can be incorporated into both the design and implementation of development plans and policies so as to ensure these efforts serve to protect and fulfill the rights of ordinary people.
In an age when economic crisis is being used as a pretext in many countries to cut the types of social spending and development cooperation needed to meet the Millennium Development Goals, decision-makers should remember that international human rights law mandates them to deploy the maximum of available resources for the fulfillment of economic and social rights. This includes the generation of resources, through progressive taxation and whatever other means may be available, and the fullest possible international cooperation by both donor and recipient states. It is likewise imperative that existing aid promises be fulfilled.
Operationalizing the principles of equality and non-discrimination in development policy can likewise guarantee that economic progress serves to protect vulnerable sectors and diminish the disparities in our society, rather than exacerbate them. Given that rising inequality both within and between countries was one of the key contributory factors to the global economic crisis, the importance of tackling this issue cannot be understated. Entrenched inequality is not only a moral question - it is also represents an economic blight as it manifests in a dearth of opportunities which in turn translates into the wasting of our most valuable resource: people.
Moreover, the standards that form the human rights framework apply to states not only in their domestic policy-making, but also through their international interactions and their membership of international governance institutions.
It is to be hoped that the weakness of the document that has emerged from last week’s negotiations in Rio will be compensated by a more meaningful set of “SDGs”. The process of designing these goals, that will get underway at the UN General Assembly in September, may have determinative influence on the future course of global development, and thereby on the lives and wellbeing of people everywhere. With the deadline for the MDGs just a few years away, and dialogue on a new set of objectives already in full swing, the SDGs will also serve as a crucial precursor to further development negotiations at a pivotal moment in our collective evolution. Amidst warnings from a panel of Nobel laureates, ministers and scientists that a business-as-usual approach may “trigger abrupt and irreversible changes with catastrophic outcomes for human societies and life as we know it,” our leaders should be fully aware of the magnitude of the responsibility they shoulder. It is not only our future, but also that of coming generations, that is at stake.
Images: First photo shows Nigerian President Goodluck Jonathan at the opening ceremony of the Rio+20 conference. Second photo shows pollution from an industrial plant flooding a fishing harbour in Washington State. Both images courtesy of UN Photo.
Posted by on June 21st, 2012
It was hailed as the "most important promise ever made to the world's most vulnerable people." But a decade on, the Millennium Declaration and the eight development goals that flowed from it risk going down in history as the most important promise never kept.
Undeniably, some progress has been made. For every child who would otherwise have died from preventable diseases, and for every woman who would not otherwise have survived pregnancy or childbirth, the efforts galvanized by the MDGs have been literally lifesaving. But the stark reality-highlighted in our focus on the MDGs for this e-newsletter-is that most of the goals are way off the targets set for 2015.
World leaders meeting at next week's UN Review Summit will no doubt give this sorry state of incompliance the best possible spin. The sluggish progress, stagnation and even deterioration in many indicators will be blamed on a lack of resources in times of economic crisis rather than any lack of political will.
But what CESR's review lays bare are the consequences of leaving human rights accountability out of the development process. The MDGs have been viewed as aspirational goals rather than politically-binding commitments. Although the UN refers to them as a "quantitative time-bound framework of accountability," the MDGs do not include effective mechanisms for holding governments to account should they fail to meet the targets.
The MDG framework has been criticized from the start as undercutting countries' human rights obligations, particularly those on economic and social rights. These obligations must take precedence, for they flow from another visionary UN declaration adopted more than 60 years ago: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. Human rights may not dictate detailed policy prescriptions for achieving specific development goals. But they do provide a binding ethical framework sorely missing in current efforts to implement the MDGs.
Principles such as the duty to use maximum available resources to progressively fulfill economic and social rights, to prioritize core obligations, and to ensure non-discrimination, participation and accountability, should guide governments' choice and prioritization of policies. The absence of such considerations in MDG implementation to date has had fatal consequences, and has meant that progress has tended to bypass the poorest and most marginalized sectors of the population, fueling inequality within and between countries.
The next five years offer an opportunity to place human rights squarely at the center of efforts to accelerate and monitor progress on the MDGs, so that these commitments, however flawed, can be used as a benchmark for assessing compliance by countries, donors and international actors with their more comprehensive human rights obligations. CESR is also working with others in the human rights and development communities to bring about a shift in the development paradigm beyond 2015, so that any new framework of development commitments that emerges following the MDGs has the fulfilment of human rights and human dignity at its core.