Building blocks for change: Reflections on FfD4 and the Compromiso de Sevilla

One of the most contentious areas of the negotiations was sovereign debt. Paragraph 50(f) of the Outcome Document, which nods toward a United Nations-led intergovernmental process to make recommendations on closing gaps in the international debt architecture and options to address debt sustainability, sparked dissociation from countries including the U.S., UK, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, Saudi Arabia, and Russia. This reflects broader resistance from major creditors to shift authority away from IMF- and G20-dominated forums, where debtor countries have little voice, toward more inclusive, transparent spaces like the UN.

Earlier drafts of the outcome document included language proposing a full United Nations Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt, a longstanding demand from CESR, civil society groups and small island states (AOSIS) and the Africa Group. While this language was ultimately diluted, the commitment to an intergovernmental process still represents significant progress. It keeps the door open to stronger reforms, including a potential future General Assembly resolution to initiate treaty negotiations – just as the 2022 Africa Group resolution did for the United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (UNTC). 

As Mahinour ElBadawi, CESR’s Global Partnerships Lead has stated:

“A UN Framework Convention on Sovereign Debt can ensure equitable restructuring and relief, enabling countries to have the fiscal space necessary to fulfill human rights obligations and address gender justice and climate imperatives.”

Whilst not going as far as civil society advocates had hoped on debt relief, cancellation and restructuring, the outcome affirms several key principles absent from the Addis Ababa Action Agenda and G20 Common Framework including debt swaps, and alternative public credit rating agencies (CRAs). Paragraph 50(c) recognizes the procyclicality and biases of CRAs, while 50(d) encourages the development of alternative, public, regional and national rating agencies. Countries in the Africa Group and Latin America, including Brazil and Egypt, elevated this demand – underscoring how ratings exacerbate debt burdens and restrict access to finance. While the inclusion of debt swaps was welcomed by some states, it does not address the systemic nature of debt injustice and may risk reinforcing the logic of bargaining for rights without tackling underlying power imbalances.The systemic nature of debt injustice must be addressed through a rights-based framework, which ensures that debt does not undermine countries’ ability to fulfill their human rights obligations, including in areas like education, healthcare, and climate resilience.

Paragraph 48(i) creates a platform for borrower countries, informally dubbed a "Debtor's Club” to enable them to share technical experience and strategies. Egypt and Colombia emerged as champions of this initiative, underscoring its potential to increase collective leverage and shift the balance of power. This is a step towards leveling the playing field in negotiating a way out of the current debt crisis and a stepping stone towards an intergovernmental mechanism. 

In addition, the outcome mandates the creation of a UN-led working group on responsible lending and borrowing, to operate in cooperation with the IMF and World Bank. Though non-binding, this initiative revives an agenda long stalled and creates a platform for future norm-setting. CESR and its allies have consistently called for such processes to be inclusive, transparent, and grounded in human rights. Together, these steps offer political momentum that can, if sustained, advance toward a more just and multilateral sovereign debt architecture.

Taxation remains a critical arena for rights-based development. The Compromiso de Sevilla recognizes the need for progressive tax systems, which are essential for financing universal social protection that ensures no one is left behind in accessing healthcare, education, or social security. It also includes a historic reference to taxing high-net-worth individuals. Building on G20 momentum, Spain and Brazil also proposed a global tax on the super-rich, now also supported by South Africa and Chile – an emerging coalition that may help sustain this issue’s visibility. Importantly, taxing high net-worth individuals is also a priority under the ongoing negotiations toward a United Nations Framework Convention on International Tax Cooperation (UNTC). Advancing this agenda through the UNTC process will be critical to building momentum for a more equitable global tax system and resourcing rights-based economies.

The outcome document underscores the importance of tax transparency and beneficial ownership transparency as key tools to tackle illicit financial flows and ensure accountability. Paragraph 47(d) encourages strengthening frameworks for the exchange of tax information and calls for improved transparency in beneficial ownership. These provisions reflect long-standing demands from civil society and Global South governments to crack down on tax abuse by corporations and elites, and to close the loopholes that enable secrecy jurisdictions and tax havens. Implementing these commitments will be essential to rebuilding public trust and ensuring that states can mobilize sufficient, equitable revenues to fulfill human rights obligations. These fiscal reforms are essential not only for development goals but also to fulfill states’ obligations under international human rights law to mobilize the maximum of available resources. 

Paragraphs supporting gender-responsive taxation and budgeting are a welcome inclusion, even if still modest. Notably, the outcome document reflects calls led by India and several Latin American countries to address illicit financial flows and democratize global tax governance. Advocacy from the Africa Group helped secure language encouraging constructive engagement in the negotiation of the UNTC – a major step forward. For CESR and allied networks who have long championed the creation of a transparent, democratic tax body at the UN, this signals meaningful progress. 

That said, this achievement came in the face of sharp opposition: the U.S., UK, Switzerland, Japan, Korea, Canada, and Saudi Arabia all dissociated from the relevant paragraph, revealing persistent resistance from powerful states to shift tax governance away from OECD control.

The outcome document includes references to gender-responsive finance, eliminating gender-based violence, and recognizing unpaid care work. However, these commitments are aspirational and not backed by the kinds of binding reforms necessary to redistribute power and resources. CESR, together with the FfD CSO Mechanism and feminist movements, advocate for gender-responsive policies that are backed by binding reforms in debt, tax, and climate financing. 

CESR joined a feminist-led statement coordinated by the Young Feminist Caucus, which called for bold action on debt, tax, health, and climate to realize gender justice. In this context, we must move from rhetoric to accountability. Implementation mechanisms must be co-created with feminist movements and resourced adequately, especially those representing grassroots women, gender-diverse people, Indigenous and Afro-descendant communities.

The gender language came under direct attack during negotiations. The U.S. withdrew partly over gender references; Argentina asserted belief in binary genders only; and no strong defences were made other than from Iceland. In this climate, even maintaining baseline commitments was a political win – but far from sufficient.

The Compromiso does not explicitly contain strong commitments on climate finance – developed nations fell back on private finance narratives and rejected mention of United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) commitments, such as explicit climate finance pledges, the principle of Common But Differentiated Responsibilities (CBDR), and the framing of climate finance as “new and additional.” However, it does contain language that can be leveraged moving forward. 

Countries like the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Colombia, Pakistan, and Brazil emphasized the widening climate finance gap and called for increased public resources from the Global North. While no commitments were made, the document signals openness to exploring instruments such as debt-for-climate and debt-for-nature swaps. These mechanisms remain controversial and loosely defined, but their inclusion reflects growing receptivity to linking debt relief with climate action. This reflects the leadership of countries like Colombia, Brazil, and Pakistan, and opens space to reimagine such tools with equity and justice safeguards at the center.

However, civil society groups such as MENAFem have warned that:

“Debt swaps are not structural solutions. They are management tools. Tools that maintain creditor power while offering minimal relief and maximum control…Debt swaps do nothing to challenge the systemic injustices behind debt. Why do Global South countries borrow at five times the interest rates of wealthy countries? Why are we still paying for debts incurred under colonization, dictatorship, and IMF-imposed austerity? Swaps avoid these questions. They reduce justice to a transaction.”

This highlights the urgent need for climate finance mechanisms that are both inclusive and grounded in human rights, ensuring that the Global South is not burdened by unjust financial solutions that exacerbate the climate crisis.

Special Drawing Rights (SDRs) emerged as a key demand from Global South countries, many of whom expressed frustration at the absence of a new allocation or reformed mechanism for SDR redistribution. In an era of declining Official Development Assistance and escalating external debt burdens, SDRs represent one of the few tools available to unlock fiscal space without deepening indebtedness. While the Compromiso de Sevilla does not commit to a new allocation, paragraph 51(e) encourages the voluntary channeling of SDRs through multilateral development banks and other appropriate vehicles. This language, while modest, keeps the door open and reflects a broader discursive shift toward democratizing global liquidity management. 

The section on international development cooperation reiterates familiar principles around country ownership, transparency, and alignment with national priorities. However, it falls short of establishing concrete mechanisms for accountability or scaling up predictable, public financing. Civil society’s calls for stronger oversight of development cooperation, including through a proposed UN Convention on International Development Cooperation that would reframe aid as a tool of justice and reparations, were not taken up.

The Compromiso reiterates calls to reform the international financial architecture, pledging to make global economic governance more “inclusive, representative, equitable, and effective.” While such language gestures toward change, it falls short of challenging structural asymmetries. Proposals to adjust IMF quotas or diversify executive boards remain procedural and voluntary. They avoid deeper questions about who holds power, whose interests are served, and who sets the rules, especially when IFI-backed austerity limits spending on health, education, and social protection.Notably absent is any commitment to rights-based conditionality reform, democratizing decision-making processes within IFIs, or establishing a UN-led intergovernmental process to meaningfully advance international financial architecture reform. CESR and others advocate for a new architecture grounded in human rights, democratic accountability, and ecological sustainability. 

Despite these shortcomings, the inclusion of these issues at the systemic level offers an important foothold. The realization of human rights depends not only on national policies but also on global economic structures. The gaps identified in Seville must now be addressed in tandem with progress on tax, debt, and climate justice to truly build a coherent and accountable framework for financing sustainable development.